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REFUSALS TO SELL AND PUBLIC CONTROL
OF COMPETITION
RFFUsA. to sell is a business tactic in the struggle for power and profit.
It is part and parcel of the problems with which the anti-trust laws are con-
cerned. But while existing statutes are sufficient to regulate refusal to sell,
courts have often failed to bring the device within statutory prohibitions.'
Appropriate application of the anti-trust laws requires an examination of
the purpose and effect of refusals to sell. Then present legal approaches can
be better examined and evaluated.
REFUSAL TO SELL: A IARK or MoNoPoLY PowEn
A producer in a purely competitive market will ordinarily sell to all comers.
He will refuse only if his entire output is already spoken for, or if the
sale would be unprofitable, or if the would-be buyer is a poor credit risk.
Since his own output is but an insignificant fraction of the supply, he cannot
alter the market price by thus limiting his sales.2
But the situation is different when the producer has a substantial degree of
monopoly power stemming from a patent, a trade-mark, a secret process, a
locational advantage, or comparative size-3 Within the limits of his mo-
nopoly position the producer can use refusal to sell as a device to influence
prices. Moreover, he has a weapon with which to extend his power over the
market.
1. E.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Y. Cream of Wheat Co., 224 Fed. 56
(S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915) (suggestion of a constitutional privi-
lege); R. G. Brown, The Right To Refuse To Sell, 25 Mfumn L. J. 194 (1916).
The present reluctance of the federal courts'to compel sales is illustrated in their
adjustment of anti-trust decrees. See, e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
321 U.S. 707, 728-9 (1944); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F.Supp.
32, 42 (D.Minn. 1945); ef. Seegert, Compzdsory Licensing By Jvdicial Action: A Reiedy
for Misuse of Patents, 47 MfcH. L. Rsv. 613, 635-6 (1949); Comment, 56 YtAm L J.
77 (1946). And in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 45-6 (1945), Justice
Roberts, dissenting, feared that the decision turned a private business into a public utility.
What the Justice feared was in effect advocated years ago: that a corporation achieving
substantial monopoly should be held to the standards of a public utility. See Adler, Busi-
wess Jurisprudence, 28 H.nv. L. REv. 135 (1914) ; Wyman, The Law of thc Public Call-
ings as a'Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HAnv. L. REv. 156, 217 (1904).
Considerable uncertainty remains as to the scope of the privilege to refuse to sell.
The American Law Institute recognizes the privilege; but in general it takes no position
as to liability where a refusal to deal is (a) a breach of duty from the nature of the
business or from legislative enactment, (b) a means of accomplishing an illegal effect on
competition, or (c) part of a concerted refusal by a combination of persons of which the
defendant is a member. 4 REsTATEmE-zT, TonTs § 762 (1939). See also TOUL =-, Tr,:
AREEm NTS AND THE ANrsi-TRusT LAws §§ 127, 156 (1937).
2. For a general description of the characteristics of a competitive market, Eee
BouJDInG, Ecoxoxc ANALYsis, c. 22 (rev. ed. 1948); CHA-mERmL., TrH THEoy o7
MoNoPoLisTnc Comsarzox 16-20 (5th ed. 1946).
3. See, e.g., BAMN, PrIcINq, DISTRMUTION AND EMPLOYI T 140 (1943).
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Preventing Competition in Distribution
A producer runs the risk of reduced profits when he makes unrestricted
sales, at a set price to all distributors. Competition among these distributors
may become acute, and the consequent decrease in their profit margins creates
downward pressure against the producer's own price.4 The pressure is made
more severe by the presence of chain stores, mail order houses, and other mass
retail distributors, who can demand the producer's "wholesale" price or less.
This saving, plus operational economies, often enables these large distributors
to offer consumers a lower price than do wholesale-retail channels.6 The re-
tailers and wholesalers in turn demand that the producer remove the mass
distributors' price advantage. And a second danger arises where the producer
short-circuits his regular distribution channels by selling directly to a few
large-scale consumers at more than the wholesale price. If he exerts no con-
trol over his distributors, they may compete with the producer himself for
these sales.6 Thus bedeviled, the producer may seek to reduce distributive
competition.
Several devices are available.7 A direct method is "vertical integration
forward," in which the producer sets up his own distribution system and re-
fuses to sell to independent distributors.8 Heavy investment in retail outlets,
however, will be practical only if the product is costly enough and popular
enough to justify stores selling that product only, or if the producer is willing
to enter a general retail business.
Another device which may be employed is a resale price maintenance agree-
ment on each sale.9 Or, with less formality, the producer may "suggest"
the proper resale price, cutting off any distributors who disregard his sug-
gestion.' 0
A less obvious method of protecting price is to limit the outlets in any area
from the beginning, thus forestalling the competition which leads to price
cutting. This is achieved by the exclusive sales arrangement, in which the pro-
4. See PURDY, LINDAHL & CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
395 (1942).
5. Ibid. For a discussion of the efficiencies achieved by chain stores in the grocery
field, see HoFFmAN, LARGE SCALE ORGANIZATION IN THE Fooo INDUSTRIEs 62-75 (TNEC
Monograph 35, 1940).
6. E.g., United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F.Supp. 32 (D.Minn.
1945).
7. See MLIR, UNFAIR CompETITION 210, 234-5 (1941), and sources cited therein.
For an example of the similarity and interrelationship of the several devices, see Baran v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
8. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359 (1927). An alternate method is the use of agency agreements. See note 42
infra.
9. For an extensive economic analysis of resale price maintenance, see MILLEn, UN-
FAIR CoMPETITION 245-66 (1941). See also PuRDy, LiNDAHL & CARan, CoavoA rm CON-
CENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 394-5 (1942).
10. E.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), discussed infra
p. 1126.
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ducer selects one or more distributors for each area, sells to them only, and
directs them to stay in their own territory."
Finally, the producer may cut competition in distribution channels by clas-
sifying chains and other mass distributors as "retailers," and then either charg-
ing them more than the price charged "wholesalers," or selling to "whole-
salers" only.' 2 The producer can thus curb the opportunity of the chains to
undercut the rest of the market.
Refusal to sell is involved to some degree in all of these methods of secur-
ing control over a price structure. It comes as a matter of course with vertical
integration. It is a policing device for a producer engaged in outright resale
price maintenance. It is the crux of the matter in exclusive sales arrangements.
And refusal to sell to large distributors classified as "retailers" is one way to
keep them from cutting prices.
Aggressive use of refusal to sell
Refusal to sell is used not only to control a price structure, but also as a
lever to extend the producer's existing monopoly power. When a producer of
a distinctive article also turns out products which are sold in a competitive
market, he may make his control of the unique item do double duty. The re-
sult is a "tie-in" sale :13 the holder of a patent on a salt-tablet dispenser, for ex-
ample, may refuse to sell unless the buyers use his salt tablets, which are no
different from other brands.14 A producer may also hinder the marketing of
11. E.g., Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 37 F.Supp. 999 (S.D.X.Y.
1941), aff'd, 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), reh'g denied, 130 F2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
12. E.g., Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denicd, 262 U.S.
759 (1923) (price higher than to wholesalers); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915) (selling to wholesalers only); see
Slichter, The Cream of W1heat Case, 31 PoL. Scr. Q. 392 (1916); Shaiderman, "The
Tyranny of Labels"--A Study of Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Pain:an Act,
60 HAuv. L. REv. 571 (1947).
Both devices may be termed "defensive price discrimination," in contrast to the
ordinary type of price discrimination involved in extracting the best price from each of
a series of separate markets or in lowering prices in a particular area to drive a com-
petitor out of business. Refusals to sell attacked as price discrimination, however, have
not always involved either this purpose of ordinary price discrimination, or "defensive
price discrimination" of the kind outlined in the text. See pp. 1132-4 irnfra.
13. "A tying arrangement is a successful business practice only in the circumstance
that the seller has a strong monopoly position in one or more products." lMr.rn, Uz,,-M
ComErirrox 199 (1941). For the varying economic effects of a tie-in arrangement, see
id. at 200-3.
14. Cf. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tie-in clause in
patent lease illegal) ; International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 293 U.S.
131 (1936) (condition that lease shall terminate in ease any cards not manufactured by
the lessor are used in the leased machine: illegal); see Notes, 57 YA=n L. J. 1293
(1948); 48 Col. L. REv. 733 (1948). It is not certain that the decisions would have
been the same if, instead of an express tie-in clause, there had been merely a refusal to
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products which are close substitutes for his own. He may require the dealer
to push his product. Or he may refuse to sell unless the dealer drops substitute
items altogether.15
Group refusal to sell
Where an individual lacks sufficient power to make his refusal to sell a sig-
nificant factor in the market, then group activity by several sellers may make
the device effective.'6 As in the case of individual producers, the success of
group refusal rests on the extent of monopoly power over the product in ques-
Stion. There is no economic reason for differentiating individual refusal, where
the power is a product of uniqueness or of individual size, from group refusal,
where power is achieved through combination. The impact on competition
depends on power, not numbers.
Summary
Effective refusal to sell operates as a restraint on trade, mild or severe.
Distribution channels are narrowed, prices are raised, existing and potential
competitors are injured, or monopoly influences are extended to other lines of
business. Refusal to sell, therefore, is a practice which should be examined in
the light of anti-trust law.
REFUSAL TO SELL AND THE COURTS
Despite the inherently restrictive nature of refusal to sell, the courts have
tended to concentrate on the form in which the device is used rather than on
the seriousness of its effects.' 7
sell one item without a simultaneous sale of the other. Cf. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421
(1920) (tie-in of unpatented goods allowed). And see cases cited note 45 infra.
15. See cases cited note 45 infra.
16. "... [W]here there is a high degree of substitution between branded products,
successful price maintenance will be achieved only where rivals follow similar policies."
MILLEn, UNFAIR Com riioN 260 (1941).
17. When found as an integral part of an over-all monopolistic plan, refusal to sell
is condemned along with the rest of the plan. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 808 (1946); Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936). But reluctance to outlaw the "pure" refusal leads to results of greatly varying
merit. In addition to the cases discussed elsewhere in this Comment, consider the follow-
ing miscellaneous situations in which refusals have been upheld: FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S.
421 (1921) (refusal to sell steel ties without a purchase of bagging to be used with
them) ; Green v. Electric Vacuum Co., 132 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. dismissed, 319
U.S. 777 (1943) (to prevent rebuilding and resale of traded-in vacuum cleaners) ; Green v.
Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1928) (to coerce the sale of stock) ;
Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 262 U.S, 759 (1923) (refusal
to sell at wholesale price to retailers' cooperative); Boro Hall Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 37 F.Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942),
relkg denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943) (to uphold
quality of distributors) ; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F.Supp. 824 (D.Md.
1938) (to coerce a dealer into buying up or selling out to another); In the Matter of
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This formalistic approach is not dictated by the anti-trust laws. Present
legislation is sufficiently flexible to enable the courts to strike down any trade
practice which they view as an unreasonable restraint of competition?28
Elimination of price cutters
Refusal to sell, like outright agreement, can be used to effect resale price
maintenance. Yet judicial treatment of the two devices has been far from
parallel. Resale price maintenance by contract was early held illegal.10 And al-
Bird & Son, 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937) (to reduce distribution costs); Koss v. Continental
Oil Co., 222 Ind. 224, 52 N.E2d 614 (1944) (refusal to sell to a filling station ovmer
who was violating union rules as to operating hours); Foster v. Shubert Holding Co.,
316 fass. 470, 55 N.E.2d 772 (1944) (to distribute theater tickets without the use of a
ticket agency); Hompes v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 137 Neb. S4, 288 N.WV. 367 (1939)
(allegedly to force distributor to sell out cheaply) ; Nissen v. Andres, 173 OlJa. 469, 63
P.2d 47 (1936) (refusal to sell to competitor); McMaster v. Ford Motor Co., 123 S.C.
244; 115 S.E. 244 (1921) (to prevent installation of device on cars made by defendant) ;
cf. FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924) (refusal to buy in order to
force exclusive selling). But see United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed.
502 (E.D.Pa. 1915), appeal disnd.sed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921) (selling only to jobbers who
maintained resale prices and who dealt exclusively in defendant's goods constituted a
violation of the Sherman Act).
18. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is particularly appropriate: "Un-
fair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce, are hereby declared unlawful." 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45
(1946). Originally a strict limitation vas placed on the meaning of the statute. But
more recently, it has been given wider scope. Compare FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421,
427 (1920), with FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 690-3, 703-9 (1948).
A sharp distinction has at times been drawn betveen this regulation of unfair com-
petition in the interest of business morality, and the preservation of competition by the
Sherman Act provisions against restraint of trade. See Handler, Unfair Co, pcltion,
21 IowA L. REv. 175, 214 (1936). "The law of boycott [i.e., refusal to deal] is rooted in
the soil of restraint of trade rather than unfair competition." Id. at 202. But even writers
who urge this questionable distinction may concede that in practice there is great overlap.
See Schwartz, Book Review, 5S YAL= L. J. 198 (1948).
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) includes in its list of unfair methods and
practices:
"Trade boycotts or combinations of traders to prevent certain wholesale or retail
dealers or certain classes of such dealers from procuring goods at the same terms
accorded to the boycotters or conspirators, or through coercion to influence the
trade policy of their competitors or of manufacturers from whom they buy."
REP. FTC 53 (1947).
It might appear that the word "or" between "Trade boycotts" and "combinations of
traders" in the above quotation is conjunctive, and only group boycotts are condemned
by the Commission. Most cases brought by the FTC on individual refusals to deal have
involved refusals to sell to price cutters. Nonetheless the FTC has on occasion considered
other individual refusals to sell to be unfair methods of competition. See In the Matter
of R. B. Semler, Inc., 42 F.T.C. 372 (1946) (to force exclusive dealing); In the Matter
of Letellier-Phillips Paper Company, 27 F.T.C. 741 (1933) (same).
19. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Note, 7 A.L-R.
449 (1920). This is now part of the broader rule that agreements to fix or maintain
19491
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though in many instances the Miller-Tydings Act2 ( and state Fair Trade
acts21 now permit such contracts, the old rule still applies outside of that pro-
tected area. 22
Refusals to sell, on the other hand, have often been accorded a special im-
munity not granted to restraints of trade achieved by direct agreement. The
chief source of confusion has been United States v. Colgate & Co.12 3 where the
Supreme Court broadly affirmed the privilege to refuse to sell, despite the fact
that it resulted in resale price maintenance. The indictment in that case alleged
not only that supplies were cut off from price cutters, but also that resale
prices were named by the company, that dealers were urged to observe the
prices on pain of losing their supply, that dealers were urged to report any
sales by others at different prices, that lists of price cutters were kept, and that
assurance of future compliance was secured from reported dealers and from
prospective dealers.2 4 Dismissing the indictment, the Court broadly affirmed
the privilege to refuse to sell. Moreover, Justice McReynolds affixed to the
privilege a further canon: "And of course [one] may announce in advance
the circumstances under which he will sell."125
prices in interstate commerce are illegal per se. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927).
20. The Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946), adds to Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act the provisions that
"... [N]othing herein contained shall render illegal, contracts or agreements pre-
scribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label
or container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or
distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, when
contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate
transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in
any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be
made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale, and the
making of such contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method of com-
petition. . . . [T]he preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agree-
ment, providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices
on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between producers,
or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between
retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each
other. . ....
21. McLaughlin, Fair Trade Acts, 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 803 (1938) ; Shulmau, The
Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE
L. J. 607 (1940).
22. E.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296-7 (1945);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723-4 (1944).
23. 250 U.S. 300 (1919); accord, e.g., Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. FTC, 15 F.2d
274 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 759 (1927) ; United States v. Hudnut, 8 F.2d
1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
24. The indictment is restated in Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance, 32 YALE L. J.
676, 685-6 (1923).
25. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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The Colgate case virtually invited resale price maintenance. Indeed, one
lower court, in United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.,20 took the Colgate
decision to reinstate resale price maintenance agreements. Any variance be-
tween express agreements and a tacit understanding seemed to the court a
distinction without a difference.2 7 But the Supreme Court reversed,2 thus
preserving the anomaly. Regardless of the merits of resale price mainte-
nance,29 the lower court's view seems correct. The prompt elimination of a
price cutter by refusing to sell to him is probably more effective than a damage
suit after breach of a formal contract.
Further confinement of the Colgate rule was not long in coming. The deci-
sion in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,20 purportedly an attempt to harmonize
conflicting interpretations of the Colgate case, was in effect its antithesis. The
Beech-Nut decision attempted a distinction between a simple refusal to sell and
schemes designed to make that refusal effective. Yet the condemned plan seem-
ingly contained the same attempts to discover price cutting as did the Colgate
plan, with the single additional feature that the cases of defendant's products
were marked and traced. 31
26. 264 Fed. 175 (N.D.Ohio 1919), rev'd, 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
27. 264 Fed. 175, 13 (N.D.Ohio 1919). See Dunn, Resale Price Mainlenance, 32
YALE L. J. 676, 691-3 (1923) ("the reality of the situation is that the Colgate case es-
sentially legalizes what the Miles case outlaws").
28. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). The opinionless
dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis may signify agreement with the trial court
that the situations are indistinguishable. Neither Justice took exception to the Colgate
decision; they simply did not oppose resale price maintenance. See FTC v. Beech-Nut
Pacldng Company, 257 U.S. 441, 456 (1922) (dissenting opinion).
Justice McReynolds, speaking for the majority in the Schrader case, referred to
... the obvious difference between the situation presented vhen a manufacturer merely
indicates his wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings vith all who fail to
observe them, and one where he enters into agreements-whether express or implied
from a course of dealing or other circumstances-vith all customers throughout the
different States which undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices." 252 U.S.
85, 99 (1920). But cf. Justice McReynolds dissenting in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Company, supra, at 458.
A similar distinction had been drawn in the leading case against resale price main-
tenance, Dr. Miles 'Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company, 220 U.S. 373,
404 (1911) : "But because a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it dces not fol-
low that in case of sales actually made he may impose upon purchasers every sort of
restriction."
29. See OPPExHEL.X, CASES ON FEDRAmL ANrs-TRusT LAws 383-7 (1943), and
sources cited therein; also see note 21 supra.
30. 257 U.S. 441 (1922). See Note, The Attitude of the Federal Courts Taward Re-
sale Price Maintenance Since the Beechnut Decision, 27 COL L. RM. 183 (1927,).
31. 257 U.S. 441, 446-51 (1922). The court also attempted to distinguish the Colgate
case on the ground that the Colgate case was heard on a demurrer to an indictment
brought under the Sherman Act, whereas the Beech-Nut case was brought under the
Federal Trade Commission Act. For a criticism of the procedural aspects of the Colgate
case see McLaughlin, Fair Trade Acts, 86 U. op P.4- L. Rnv. R03, 803-10 (1933). How-
19491 ,117
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Naturally enough, the tenuous distinction between the Colgate and Beech-
Nut plans led to considerable confusion in the lower courts. A price mainte-
nance plan wa- illegal only if a court detected some element of "agreement."8
A court of appeals in one circuit soon supplied a ready-made reductio ad
absurdum which was nevertheless the correct interpretation of the Supreme
Court decisions.3 Walking a tight-rope between "cooperation" and "individ-
ual action," the court held these practices invalid:
"(1) Requiring from dealers assurance that they will be governed
by the suggested resale discounts in the disposal of stocks previously
purchased, as a condition precedent to subsequent sales to them by
respondent.
"(2) Requiring from dealers placing orders assurances that the
commodities so ordered will be resold at the suggested resale dis-
counts as a condition precedent to the acceptance of such orders.
"(3) Requiring from dealers generally assurances that they will
be governed by the suggested resale discounts in all resales of re-
spondent's products, under threat of discontinuance of relations."' 4
In the same case these practices were upheld:
". .. manifesting to dealers an intention to act upon all reports
sent in by them of variations from the resale discounts by the elimina-
tion of the price cutter; ... informing dealers that price cutters
reported, who would not give assurance of adherence to the sug-
gested resale discounts, had been or would be refused further sales;
.. .employing its salesmen to investigate charges of price cutting
reported by dealers and advising dealers of that fact. . ". 3
This self-defeating result was soon prevented by further encroachments on
the Colgate doctrine. Price maintenance plans are now restrained not only
when an element of agreement or cooperation is present, but, alternatively,
when courts find any other acts collateral to the refusal to sell. Such plans have
been found illegal when they included one or more of the following: procuring
agents and retailers to report price cutters,30 informing dealers that reported
price cutters will be 7 or have been38 refused sales, keeping a "do not sell"
list,39 getting assurance that one will cease price cutting before selling to him
ever, the Colgate case has controlled cases brought by the Federal Trade Commission,
See, e.g. Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337, 340-1 (6th Cir. 1926).
32. Compare Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1919)
(legal), with Oppenheim, Oberndorf & Co. v. FTC, 5 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1925) (illegal).
33. Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1926); accord,
Cream of Wheat Co. v. FTC, 14 F.2d 40, 49-50 (8th Cir. 1926).
34. Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1926).
35. Ibid.
36. E.g., Q.R.S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926).
37. E.g., Moir v. FTC, 12 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1926).
38. E.g., J. W. Kobi Co. v. FTC, 23 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1927).
39. E.g., Hills Bros. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. dngied, 270 U.S. 662
(1926).
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further,40 numbering packages in order to facilitate the detection of price
cutters,4 1 and using refusal to sell in an over-all price fixing scheme. 2 By
attacking these collateral practices, the courts have virtually condemned the
underlying purpose-resale price maintenance4 3
When a leading case is beset by qualifications and then atrophied by lack of
use, its final demise is difficult to detect. Perhaps the Colgate case is dead,
despite frequent citation. But doubt remains:1 4 The Colgate case, still a symn-
bol of special immunity for all refusals to sell, should be expresss, overruled
at the earliest opportunity.
Exclusive sales arrangements: avoiding potential price cutters
Exclusive sales arrangements-under which a producer refuses to sell to
all or some of the would-be competitors of his buver-ma, be as effective in
40. E.g., Shakespeare Co. v. FTC, 50 F2d 758 (6th Cir. 1931), 30 Mxcn. L. Rsv.
634 (1932).
41. E.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
42. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 781, S03 (1946).
Control of the final price of sale, however, may be achieved by vertical integration
and possibly by setting up agency relationships. See Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States, 17 U.S.L. WEmc 4510, 4515 (U.S. June 13, 1949); id. at 4518 (dissenting
opinion). Compare United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) and FTC
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 56S (1923) (agency devices successful), %izth United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) and United States v. General Electric Co.,
80 F.Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (control of prices set by "agents" on patented matter
illegal) ; see Comment, 51 Ysiu L. J. 299 (1941) ; Note, 61 HAnv. L. REv. 1427 (1943).
Also see note 48 infra.
43. The Court used the same approach in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), where the refusal to sell was not just to eliminate price cutters
but was to assure that resale would be only to listed dealers, who dealt only in defendant's
goods and who were "ethical.'
44. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 729 (1944).
In Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), the court suggested that a
producer refuse to sell at a discount to jobbers who resold to retailers at less than the
producer's own price to retailers.
A court may still go to some lengths in freeing defendants from the charge of a
price maintenance plan. In Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber Co., 117 F2d 53 (8th Cir.
1941), defendant lumber suppliers were held not to be members of an existing conspiracy
to force plaintiffs out of operation of a "cut rate" lumber yard. But under pressure
from their other customers, who were the conspirators, the suppliers refused to sell to
plaintiffs. In releasing the suppliers, the court was careful to avoid charging them with
any knowledge of the price maintenance plan. Ignorance of the purpose of the combina-
tion may have been a necessary finding in excusing the suppliers from the charge of
conspiracy. But the decision scrupulously avoids any consideration of price maintenance,
citing the Colgate case in support of an unlimited privilege to refuse to sell.
Where the refusal to sell to price cutters is not a customary course of dealing, dif-
ficulty in proving the real purpose of the refusal may prevent application of the Beech-
Nut limitation of the Colgate rule. See Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. FTC, 15 F2d
274 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 759 (1927).
45. The legality of exclusive arrangements depends largely on whether the limita-
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preventing competition in a distribution system as is the refusal to sell to
proven price cutters. One might expect, therefore, that exclusive sales ar-
rangements would be given equally strict treatment.
Instead, exclusive sales arrangements are widely upheld.40 Only in one
state, and there by reason of specific statute,47 are exclusive sales arrange-
ments generally condemned.48 Elsewhere even the extreme situation of a total
tion is on the right to buy or on the right to sell. Whereas exclusive sales arrangements
(also called exclusive representation arrangements) are leniently treated under the
"rule of reason" of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes an exclusive
dealer arrangement-defined as a condition, agreement, or understanding by a purchaser
that he is not to handle the goods of a competitor of the seller-illegal if it may sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in interstate commerce. 38
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946). See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States, 17 U.S.L. WEE:K 4510 (U.S. June 13, 1949) ; Standard Fashion Co. v. Ma-
grane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922). A tie-in sale constitutes a partial exclusive dealer-
ship: to the extent that a purchaser is forced to take his requirements from one seller, he
is prevented from buying from other sellers. It too is within the condemnation of the
statute. See note 14 .rupra.
The contrast between treatment of exclusive sales arrangements and of exclusive
dealer arrangements may be due to the supposedly greater need for protection of re-
tailers than of distributors, and of distributors than of manufacturers. The theory is
that the unit closest to the retail level will be the smallest. 51 CoNG. REc, 9407 (1914).
A similar contrast, perhaps on the same theory, may be found where the buyer agrees
not to sell without permission of the original seller. See note 54 infra. On the other
hand, the legality of group boycott does not depend on whether the limitation is on the
right to buy or on the right to sell. See pp. 1136-40 infra.
Although Section 3 of the Clayton Act outlaws exclusive dealer agreements, a
similar arrangement without benefit of specific contract perhaps could be legally achieved
by refusing to sell to those who carry a competitor's product. Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola
Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946); Camfield Mfg. Co. v. McGraw Electric Co., 70 F.Supp.
477, 481 (D.Del. 1947) ; Andrew Jergens Co. v. Woodbury, Inc., 271 Fed. 43 (D.Del.
1920). Contra: United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502 (E.D.Pa.
1915), appeal disinissed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921) ; R. B. Semler, Inc. 42 F.T.C. 372 (1946);
35 COL. L. Rav. 127 (1935) ; cf. B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 Fed. 720 (7th
Cir. 1923). The Supreme Court has recognized that exclusive dealer agreements, and
refusals to sell to those who decline to enter exclusive dealer agreements, may be equiva-
lent. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 464 (1941).
46. See cases collected in OPPENHEIM, CASES ONe FEDERAL ANTi-TRusT LAws
598-601 (1948) ; 36 AiAt. JUR. 514-6 (1941) ; Note, 27 COL. L. Rav. 838 (1927). Contra.
Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 203 Pac. 760 (1922) (exclusive right to sell lobsters on
West Coast north of parallel 36); F. W. Cook Co. v. Page, 294 S.W. 934 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927).
The exclusive sales arrangement is generally upheld whether achieved by specific
agreement or simply by refusals to sell to dealers not selected. Compare the situation
with regard to exclusive dealer arrangements, note 45 supra.
47. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT., art. 7428 (Vernon, Supp. 1948). See Note, Exclusive
Territory Agreements as Affected by the Texas Anti-Trust Law, 6 TEX. L. R.v. 210
(1928).
48. See note 46 supra. Even in Texas, where exclusive sales contracts are outlawed,
exclusive sales arrangements achieved without formal agreement or by agency are ap-
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output contract is rarely held illegal.1
But just as the special immunity of other refusals to sell is lost when refusal
becomes part of a larger scheme,w so is an exclusive sales arrangement subject
to judicial censure when it is merged with an over-all price maintenance plan,"I
a group boycott,52 or an exclusive dealership. 3 The agreement may also be
stricken as an unreasonable restraint on trade in the special case-not by defi-
nition an exclusive sales arrangement-where the buyer agrees to sell only to
dealers approved by the original seller.r4
The exclusive sales arrangement by itself is apparently considered less
harmful. The benefits which accrue to the original seller are in some measure
derived from greater efficiency in the distribution system.m Greater efficiency
may lead to the lowering of prices in order to achieve higher sales, especially
if there is considerable competition from similar products. A portion of the
original seller's benefits thus passes to the public. At least the exclusive sales
arrangement will injure consumers less often than its converse, the exclusive
patently allowed. See Jax Beer Co. v. Palmer, 150 S.W2d 452 (Tex-:. Civ. App. 1941)
(no agreement); Double Seal Ring Co. v. Keith, 107 S.V-d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)
(agency).
49. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), note
83 i fzra.
50. See note 17 supra.
51. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) ; cf. United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
52. Hawarden v. Youghiogheny & Lehigh Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 17 N.W. 472
(1901).
53. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F.Supp. 723 (M.D.Ga. 1942), inodificd
on other grounutr, 131 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1942).
The co-existence of an exclusive dealership with an exclusive sales arrangement
may be hard to prove. Business experience might indicate that one reason why dealers,
though not bound by contract, carry only one make of goods is that they feel they would
forfeit their exclusive sales territory if they were to attempt to carry a competing model.
See Camfield Mlfg. Co. v. McGraw Electric Co., 70 F.Supp. 477, 481 (D.Del. 1947); and
see note 45 supra.
The force of the prohibition against exclusive dealer agreements and any future
prohibition against exclusive sales arrangements might be attenuated by contracts of
agency. In such a case the seller becomes the principal, and is able to dictate the terms
of redistribution of the goods consigned. Accord, Mss. GE:. LAws, c. 93, § 1 (Ter. Ed.
1932) ; and see note 42 supra. Federal legislators recognized this possibility. 51 Co:.G.
REc. 9160, 9256, 9407, 9410-1 (1914).
54. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Ethyl Gas-
oline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). But cf. Hood Rubber Co. v. United
States Rubber Co., 229 Fed. 583 (D.Mass. 1916) (sellers' agreement to sell only to per-
sons approved by the buyer does not give rise to cause of action against sellers). An
agreement is condemned, however, where terms and conditions of resale are fixed in order
to give the original seller such control of his distribution system that he can control
later prices and prevent competition. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Ccrp., 316 U.S.
265 (1942).
55. NEw YoRx UNzi_ yrr- Buaran OF Busnr:ss RsEsArcou, THE ExcLus-E
AGENcy 11-6 (1923) ; see LEARNED, PRoI.BEIs IN Mmxvrn IGEi 161-79 (1936) passim.
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dealer agreement, which prevents a dealer from handling competing productsU0
The latter arrangement, if made with all the important distributors in an area,
may force competing products off the market altogether.
But where a seller has a stronger degree of monopoly power, the total effect
of an exclusive sales arrangement may also be undesirable. The benefits of
efficiency are less likely to reach the consumer. And the elimination of dis-
tributive competition may take the form of automatic resale price mainte-
nance. 157 Wholesalers and retailers with exclusive rights in a unique commodity
have no price competition to meet. Hence the producer is relieved of pressure
against his own price."
The exclusive sales arrangement, as a definite restraint on trade, must re-
main suspect. Since resale price maintenance by refusal to sell to price cutters
is in many instances outlawed,"8 more subtle price maintenance by exclusive
sales arrangements should tfot go unfettered.
Refusal to sell as a form of price discrimination
Refusals to sell have been attacked on occasion as a form of price discrim-
ination. While such attacks have generally failed, the approach provides a
suitable method of curbing improper refusals to sell.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act forbids unwarranted discrimination in price
between different purchasers of commodities in interstate commerce where the
effect ". . . may be substantially to lessen compdtition or tend to create a
monopoly. . . ."59 At present, literal interpretation insulates refusals to sell
against this section of the anti-trust laws : when there is a refusal to sell there
can be neither "purchaser" nor "price" as required by the act.00 Moreover,
56. See note 45 supra.
57. NEw YoRK UNIVERSITY BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, THE ExCLUsivE
AGENCY 15 (1923).
58. See pp. 1125-9 .rupra.
59. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in [interstate] commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, . . . where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them . ." 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
See Crowley, Equal Price Treatment Under the Robinson-Patnan Act, 95 U. oF PA,
L. Rav. 306 (1947) ; Haslett, Price Discrinzinationd and their Jusifications Under the
Robinson-Patinat Act of 1936, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 450 (1948).
60. Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939), afflrming 26
F.Supp. 713 (E.D.Pa. 1939); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick Corp., 46 F.Supp.
709 (E.D.Pa. 1942) ; Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co., 26 F.Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal.
1939),; see Bayly, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 25 MINN. L. Rrv. 131,
133-4, 167-8 (1941); cf. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755
(1947). Contra: Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers, 40 F.2d 620
(7th Cir. 1930); see Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 26 F.Supp. 713 (E.D.Pa. 1939),
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the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts specifically provide that they do not
". .. prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in [in-
terstate] commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transac-
tions and not in restraint of trade. . . ."6 Despite some contrary interpreta-
tions of the legislative history, 2 the usual view in the light of this proviso is
that Section 2 does not prevent A from refusing to make B his customer and
thus with impunity refusing to sell B his products at any price, regardless of
his price policy toward other customers.0
Yet logically complete refusal to sell is only a refusal to sell at any but a
prohibitive price. In practice, moreover, a complete refusal to sell can often
be used with the purpose and effect of price discrimination.01 Usually the de-
aff'd on other grounds, supra; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F.Supp. 824, 825
(D.Md. 1937).
61. 38 STAT. 730-1 (1914), as amended, 49 SxAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
62. See 40 Cot. L. Rsv. 157 (1940); 11 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 122 (1942). The
intent of Congress on this point is by no means clear. See 80 CowG. Rc. 5723, 6281,
6333, 9418 (1935).
63. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F.Supp. 723, 734 (M.D.Ga. 1942),
modified on other grounds, 131 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Note, Compulsory Sales Under
the Clayton Act, 29 HAnv. L. Rsv. 77 (1915) ; cf. ToULuI, TnAz AGmm _,-Ts AzO
Tmn AxTI-TRusT LAws 292 (1937). One of the sponsors of the Robinson-Patman Act
took a different view, and adopted the negative implication of the proviso: "A seller shall
not refuse to sell, or to select customers, where the effect restrains trade." PAx.A::, Tn
RoBiNson-PATmA Acr 151 (1938).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized in an allied context that price
discrimination can occur outside of an actual purchase contract. Corn Products Refining
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 743-4 (1945) involved Section 2(e) of the Clayton Act, wvhich
reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, vith or vwithout
processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing
of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering
for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on
proportionally equal terms." 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 ST.%T. 1527 (1935),
15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1946). The Supreme Court held that the above section applies when
the discrimination is not within the purchase contract but is in favor of one who has
been a purchaser in general. Cf. Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F2d 331 (3d Cir.
1939), 40 COL L. REv. 157 (1940); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brich Corp, 46
F.Supp. 709 (E.D.Pa. 1942), 11 Gso. WASH. L. REv. 122 (1942). In both these latter
cases the plaintiffs had been purchasers in the past.
64. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 2.7 Fed. 46 (2d
Cir. 1915),'the court upheld a refusal to sell which served the purpose of "defensive price
discrimination" (defined note 12 stpra). And in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d
210, 217 (7th Cir. 1949), a court order presented the defendant with the alternatives of
(a) refusing to sell to price cutting jobbers, or (b) selling to them at the same price
offered retailers. The latter course appears to be "defensive price discrimination," and
the first alternative is its equivalent. Refusals to sell attacked as price discrimination
have been used for purposes much like those of refusals to sell treated elsewhere in this
Comment. E.g., Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Assn of Stationers, 40 F2d 620 (7th
Cir. 1930) (refusal to sell to one who refused to maintain resale prices); Whitv;ell v.
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sired commodity is available to the would-be buyer via the seller's normal
channels at the retail price.0 5 And, unless forewarned of the niceties of Sec-
tion 2, a producer refusing to sell at the wholesale price would himself rarely
object to selling at retail price.
Before the Clayton Act was passed, one court held that if complete refusal to
sell be justified, then discrimination in quoted price is a fortiori justified.00
Except for the specific words of the act, the reverse must be equally true:
when discrimination in price is bad, then complete refusal to sell must on like
grounds be bad.
The present insistence of the courts that only an executed transaction comes
within Section 207 seems an empty requirement. Since refusals to sell are prac-
tically and logically extensions of discrimination in price, discriminatory re-
fusals, like discriminatory sales, should be subjected to the criteria of that sec-
tion. But even if the terms of Section 2 are not considered applicable, they,
like other specific anti-trust prohibitions, determine in part the scope of unfair
methods of competition within the prohibition of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.08 The close analogy between many refusals to sell
and price discrimination is sufficient reason to classify such refusals as un-
fair methods of competition. If one method of achieving an illegal result is to
be outlawed, so should the other.
Refusal to sell as an attempt to monopolize
While courts have rejected Section 2 of the Clayton Act as a means of con-
trolling refusal to sell, Section 2 of the Sherman Act,09 condemning attempts
Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (8th Cir. 1903) (discrimination in quoted price in
order to coerce purchasers not to deal in the goods of competitors of the seller) ; Sor-
rentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick Corp., 46 F.Supp. 709 (E.D.Pa. 1942) (would
sell to plaintiff only through a dealer at retail rates in brder to establish an exclusive
sales arrangement); Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F.Supp. 824 (D.Md.
1938) (refusal to sell at dealer's discount in order to coerce plaintiff to buy up or sell out
to a competitor of the seller).
65. See, e.g., Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co., 26 F.Supp. 830, 831-2
(N.D.Cal. 1939).
66. Whitwel v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (8th Cir. 1903). The Wldl-
well case, holding discrimination in quoted price legal, has been relied on in upholding
complete refusal to sell long after the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. See Brosloug
v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 59 F.Supp. 429, 432-3 (M.D.Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir,
1946).
67. See note 60 .supra. Also see A. J. Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg.
Corp., 81 F.Supp. 890 (D.Mass. 1949), 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 915 (contracting to sell
at a discriminatory price does not violate Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act).
68. E.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922); Keasbey &
Mattison Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 940, 946 (6th Cir. 1947); See Montague, The Com-
mission's Jurisdiction Over Practices in Restraint of Trade: A Large-Scale Method of
Mass Enforcement of the Anti-Trust Laws, 8 GEO. WAsh. L. REV. 365 (1940).
69. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or con-
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to monopolize, may have greater potentialities. Its relevance is clear, since
effective refusal to sell not only presupposes some monopoly power7 but also
is frequently used to extend that power.7' It can be readily applied, for
collateral practices illegal under Section I of the Sherman Act need not be
shown; courts have only to consider the intent and effect of the refusal.
This approach has already been used in two cases. In the first of these, East-
nan Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern Photo Materials Co. 2 the defend-
ant's parent company had a monopoly in the manufacture of photographic
materials. When the parent company gained control of a supply-house com-
peting with plaintiff, the defendant discontinued sales to plaintiff. The Su-
preme Court held that this discontinuance was an illegal attempt to monopolize.
Basing the decision on this ground represents a direct limitation on refusal to
sell, since vertical integration is not illegal in itself.7 3
A federal district court has made a comparable decision without even allud-
ing to the Southern Photo case. In United States v. Klarflax Linen Looms,
Inc.7 4 the country's only manufacturer of linen rugs held up its deliveries to a
distributor which had underbid the company on a government contract for the
sale of such rugs. Here too the practice was condemned by the court as an
illegal attempt to monopolize.
Since both cases related to national monopolies, they may go no further
than early dicta75 indicating that a producer with monopoly power could not
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor. .. ." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §2 (1946).
70. See p. 1121 stpra.
71. For example, when a producer resorts to "tie-in" sales, or prevents distributors
from dealing in the goods of his nearest competitors, he is clearly attempting to e.xtend
his monopoly power. Insofar as these activities are done by contract or agreement, Sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act provides specific prohibitions. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1946). When the same things are done by refusing to sell one item without another
or by refusing to sell to those who deal in competitors' goods, the policy of Section 3
is just as much violated. The practice should then be outlawed under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act or Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, just as price discrimina-
tion by refusal to sell should be outlawed under Section 5 of the Federal Trade C-m-
mission Act. See note 68 supra; cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507
n.7 (1948), 58 YALE L. J. 764 (1949) (Sherman Act violations are determined in part
by policy of Section 7 of Clayton Act) ; Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 464 (1941) (Section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act governs
method of business which runs afoul of Section 3 of Clayton Act).
72. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
73. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 524-7 (1948), 58 YAIu L. J.
764 (1949).
74. 63 F.Supp. 32 (D.Minn. 1945), 14 GEo. WAsm L. REv. 531 (1946), 41 Ilu. L.
REv. 132 (1946).
75. In dicta the privilege to refuse to sell apparently did not extend to instances where
there was a purpose to monopolize. See, e.g.. United States v. Colgate & Co., 230 U.S.
300, 307 (1919) ; 4 REsTATEm.NT, ToRTs § 764 (1939). Nor did the privilege extend to
monopolies. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Mheat Co, 227 Fed. 46
(2d Cir. 1915) ; United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F.Supp. "05, 812 (E.D.Mich.
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seek to extend that power by refusal to sell. But both may gain added signifi-
cance from the recently expanded scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, The
label of. "monopoly"--seemingly the essential ingredient of the Southern
Photo and Klearflax cases-is now applied by the courts to control over even
a small fraction of the national market76 Hence courts may more often find
situations in which the rule of the two cases can be employed.
Group boycott
Much of the courts' difficulty in bringing individual refusal to sell within
statutory prohibitions disappears when the refusal stems from group action.
Partly due to an assumption that group action is more effective," and partly
due to explicit terms of the anti-trust laws, 78 the emphasis in these cases is
shifted from the refusal itself to the agreement or combination.70 Thus placed
1945). But see Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 195 N.Y. 565, 88 N.E. 289 (1909).
In Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F.Supp. 362 (E.D.Pa. 1947),
defendant's motion for summary judgment was dismissed where plaintiff, a champion
billiard player, accused the defendant, a manufacturer of billiard equipment, of refusing
to invite plaintiff to compete in its annual tournament because plaintiff went on an exhlibi-
tion tour arranged by a rival wholesaler. Citing the Southern Photo case, the court stated
that ". . . an illegal monopoly cannot ... refuse to deal wiih a person without suficlent
cause." Id. at 365.
76. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 235-6 (1948); Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of
Progress, 14 U. OF CHL L. REv. 567 (1947).
77. Criticism of this basis is well taken:
tNo attempt is made in the cases to ascertain the combine's economic strength. A
boycott by a powerful corporation, under the ratio decidendi of the courts, would pre-
sumably be upheld while the combined boycott of several pigmies would be denounced.
Although the presence of a combination invites the application of the conspiracy concept,
nevertheless the element of numbers seems, at best, but an adventitious factor." Handler,
Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. Rm. 175, 207-8 (1936).
The distinction between individual and group is often hazy, "The corporate interre-
lationships of the conspirators, in other words, are not determinative of the applicability
of the Sherman Act.' United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947); see
United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 404 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); Hardy, Loose and Consolidated Combinations Under the
Antitrust Laws, 21 GEo. L. J. 123 (1933) ; Note, Are Two or Morc Persons Necessary to
Have a Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act?, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 551 (1948).
78. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. . ' 26 STAT. 209 (Sherman Act, 1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1946).
79. E.g., Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 312 (1923). A combina-
tion or conspiracy can be formed without any specific agreement on the part of the con-
spirators. E.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225, 227 (1939) ;
William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743-5 (3d Cir. 1945) ; see
97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 133 (1948). Hence proof of conspiracy is the crucial point in per-
haps the majority of group boycott cases. Compare Eastern States Retail Lumber Deal-
ers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (conspiracy), with United States v.
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on more familiar ground, the courts have handed down a logical pattern of
decisions in which refusals to sell are tested directly in terms of their restraint
on competition s°
Competitors who combine in a refusal to sell do so at their peril, for group
boycott has been so consistently condemned as to suggest per sc illegality."'
Since 19142 the Supreme Court has only once upheld an agreement by which
competitors mutually limited their right to sella-3and that in a case which in-
Southern California Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 7 F2d 944 (S.D.Cal. 1925) (no con-
spiracy); cf. Southern Hardware Jobbers' Ass'n v. FTC, 290 Fed. 773 (5th Cir. 1923).
80. There is a sharp divergence in outcome as the composition of an alliance changes
from vertical units, as in exclusive sales arrangements, to horizontal units, as in group
boycott. Term requirement contracts, binding a buyer to buy and/or a seller to sell all
the buyer's requirements of a commodity for a given time are often upheld even though
they are a form of exclusive dealing arrangement. E.g., Match Corp. of America v.
Acme Match Corp., 285 Ill. App. 197, 1 N.E.2d E67 (1st Dist. 1936). Contra: Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States, 17 U.S.L. Wma 4510 (U.S. June 13, 1949). See
Stockhausen, The Conzinercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 412 (1948). Courts have often demonstrated their disfavor of require-
ment contracts by holding them unenforceable for lack of consideration. See Havighurst
& Berman, Requirement. and Output Contracts, 27 ILL L. Rtv. 1 (1932); Notes, 28
COL. L. Rm. 223 (1928), 24 A.L.R. 1352 (1923); 74 A.L.R. 476 (1931). Agreements
between those who were never competitors not to compete in the future may be found
reasonable if part of a transfer of a business, or part of an employment contract. EZg.,
Buanno v. Weinraub, 81 N.E.2d 600 (Ind. 1948) (employment contract); Heuer v.
Rubin, 62 A.2d 812 (N.J. 1949) (transfer of a business). But if the area from which the
party is excluded is too large, the agreement may be outlawed. E.g., Kex 'Mfg. Co. v.
Plu-Gum Co., 28 Ohio App. 514, 162 N.E. 816 (Cuyahoga County 1928) (entire United
States), 4 NorE DA.,n LAw. 265 (1929) ; see Pfarrar, Contracts h; Restraint of Trade,
4 Norm D ra LAw. 244 (1929).
An agreement between erstwhile competitors to split territory, geographically or
otherwise, with each party not to sell in the area of the other is normally illegal. E.g.,
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1599) ; Johnson v. Jo-eph
Schlitz Breving Co., 33 F.Supp. 176 (E.D.Tem. 1940).
81. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 5-2 (1948) ; rdrlpatricl,
Com;xercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 GEo. Ars. L R .
302, 387 (1942) ; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 764, 767 n. 17 (1949) ; 41 Cor. L. Ray. 941 (1941) ; ef.
Handler, The Sugar Institute Case and the Present Status of tle Anti-Trust Laws, 36
CoL. L. REv. 1, 14-8 (1936). But see 4 REsTATEN .-T, TonRs § 765 (1939).
82. The leading case against group boycott has long been Eastern States Retail Lum-
ber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914), in which reports of wholesalers
selling directly to consumers were circulated among the retailers, without any e.-press
agreement to boycott. While this w,%as a refusal to buy, the case was sufficient precedent
for refusals to sell, since the joining together is the distinguishing factor of group boycott.
Bobbs-ferrill Co. v. Straus, 139 Fed. 155, 191 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905). But cf. Sidney
Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers, 40 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1930).
Combinations refusing to deal had been condemned by the Supreme Court even before
the Easten States Lumber case. E.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226
U.S. 20 (1912). But such combinations had on occasion been upheld. Anderson v. United
States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898).
83. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), the court, in view
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volved persuasive extenuating circumstances, and which has now been all but
overruled.84 Moreover, a recent dictum in the Columbia Steel case stated flatly
that group boycott is illegal per se.8s
Nevertheless, lower court dicta have continued to reflect a more lenient
view.86 And the Supreme Court, even in the cases cited in the Columbia Steel
dictum,87 has indulged in such a thorough canvassing of facts that the possi-
bility of a justifiable group boycott may be implied.8
Even Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC,8 9 which is often
thought to stand for illegality per se,"° does not preclude this interpretation.
In that case, a powerful combination in the women's garment industry re-
fused to sell to manufacturers and retailers who dealt in designs "pirated" froni
their members. Outlawing the combination, the Supreme Court stated that such
a purposeful restraint on interstate commerce would not be justified even if
style copying were an acknowledged tort under the law of the state ;01 and
the Federal Trade Commission was upheld in refusing to hear much of the
of the serious economic problems in the Appalachian coal area, allowed cooperation among
competing producers, even including the creation of a joint selling agency which was to
sell substantially all the output of the producers.
On the other hand group boycotts, both with and without other factors, have been
condemned by the Supreme Court. E.g., Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) ; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
84. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 214-6 (1940).
85. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Waltham Watch Co., 47 F.Supp. 524, 531 (S.D.N.Y.
1942) (prima facie unlawful). In Butterick Pub. Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522, 526-7 (2d
Cir. 1936), a group boycott was held partially allowable, where the purpose was to pre-
vent sales of coverless magazines by dealers who had obtained refunds on their purchase
price by ripping off the covers of these unsold magazines and returning the covers to
the publishers.
Generally the lower federal courts have followed the lead of the Supreme Court in
disfavoring all group boycotts. See, e.g., Belfi v. United States, 259 Fed. 822 (3d Cir.
1919) ; Majestic Theater Co. v. United Artists Corp., 43 F.2d 991 (D.Conn. 1930). But
earlier boycotts were occasionally upheld. E.g., Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co. v. E.
Howard Watch & Clock Co., 66 Fed. 637 (2d Cir. 1895). Because of past leniency on the
part of state courts, e.g., Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1893) ;
Wolfenstein v. Fashion Originators Guild of America, 244 App.Div. 656, 280 N.YSupp.
361 (1st Dep't 1935), 36 COL. L. Ra,. 484 (1936), treatises consider group boycott ca-
pable of justification. See PaossER, ToRTs 1021-2 (1941) ; 4 RESTAtMENT, TonTs § 765
(1939).
87. The dictum cites Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S, 1 (1945) ; Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) ; Eastern States Retail Luii-
ber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Montague & Co. v.
Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
88. On at least one occasion after 1914 a Supreme Court dictum has indicated that
group boycott could be justified. See United States v. American Livestock Commission
Co., 279 U.S. 435, 437-8 (1929).
89. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
90. See note 81 supra.
91. 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
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evidence offered as to the reasonableness of the restraint. But the facts already
before the Court were enough to classify the restraint as inexcusably serious.
Some of the facets of the case were particularly disfavored restraints on com-
petition. For example, the Court laid emphasis on the use of various policing
measures ("blacklists," snoopers, fines), on the ". . . intentional destruc-
tion of one type of manufacture and sale which competed with Guild mem-
bers,"' 2 and on the general strength of the Guild. Moreover, the Court indi-
cated that the Guild's plan ran afoul of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 3 in that
goods were sold only to manufacturers and retailers who refrained from deal-
ing in "pirated" designs. Finally, the Second Circuit decision, which the Su-
preme Court affirmed without adverse comment, had specifically said that a
group boycott, though prima facie unlawful, may be justified.Y In condemn-
ing a group boycott having a fairly plausible purpose, the Fashion Originators'
decision certainly tightened the rules against group refusal to sell, but it did
not necessarily outlaw the practice beyond redemption.
Nor does Associated Press v. United States: clearly establish that group
refusal to sell is illegal per se. Admission to the defendant news agency, which
dominated the American news-gathering trade, was comparatively simple for
an applicant not serving the same area as a member. But should the applicant
be in competition with a newspaper already a member, admission was con-
tingent on the payment of a considerable sum and on a majority vote of the
members, both requirements subject in effect to the waiver of the competing
member. Nonmembers could not get AP news; and members were prohibited
by one of the by-laws from selling or furnishing spontaneous news to any
agency or publisher other than AP.
Two elements in the case must be distinguished: the group refusal to sell to
outsiders, and the discriminatory by-laws themselves. Judge Learned Hand,
spealking for a three-judge district court, had viewed the problem first as one
of group boycott 0 Finding authority indefinite, 7 but certain that such a
combination might be legally justifiable, he then appraised the dominant posi-
tion of AP and concluded that the by-laws were contracts unreasonably re-
straining trade. The Supreme Court in affirming made no speciic examina-
tion of the law of group boycott. The majority laid emphasis on the by-laws
themselves and on the dominant position of AP. While pointing out that ex-
92. Id. at 467.
93. 312 U.S. 457, 464 (1941).
94. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 114 F2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940).
The lower court decision went on to say that this particular combination was unlawful
per se. Id. at 85.
The Second Circuit had preiously been more tolerant of group boycott than most
other courts. See Butterick Pub. Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1936), note E5 sptra.
95. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See Lewin, The Associated Press Decision-An Extension of
the Sherman Act?, 13 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 247 (1946).
96. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
97. Id. st 369-70.
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clusive agreements between two papers in different cities might well be reason-
able,98 the majority found that the by-laws, viewed in the light of their designed
purpose of hampering competition, bad the net effect of seriously limit-
ing the opportunity of competitors. This effect was largely attributable to
AP's size in the trade, which the Court so stressed as to suggest that illegality
resulted less from the boycott aspects of the by-laws than from the effect
given the boycott by AP's power.99
The Court's multiple emphasis makes the case somewhat inconclusive on
the status of group boycott. Nevertheless, it is now difficult to imagine any
group boycott being sustained by the Supreme Court. Lower courts have al-
ready begun to echo the Columbia Steel dictum.100 Unless further clarifica-
tion is forthcoming, it may be supposed that only the necessarily ineffective
boycott-devoid of intent to injure, of coercive practices, and of dominant
market position-could possibly survive in the federal courts as an exercise
of the privilege to refuse to sell. And such a boycott would in most cases be so
inconsequential that litigation would not arise.
Yet the reservation which may be implied in the Associated Press and
Fashion Originators' opinions seems a desirable alternative to illegality per se.
The restraint of trade effected by group refusal to sell may be of negligible
importance. Moreover, group action may actually improve competitive condi-
tions where, for example, several small producers adopt a common selling
agency id order to survive the onslaught of giant concerns. The varying effects
of refusal to sell require application of the "rule of reason," considered in the
light of the dominant economic and social functions which Congress expects
the anti-trust laws to fulfill.
CONCLUSION
The facility with which courts strike down group boycott is in marked con-
trast with their reluctance to fit a single concern's refusal to sell into the terms
of legislative prohibitions. Yet even the single concern is far from exempt.
Refusal to sell to price cutters has been condemned, both by detecting collateral
facts subject'to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and by finding such schemes to
be unfair methods of competition. On a few occasions, other refusals to sell
have been outlawed as illegal price discrimination and as attempts to monopo-
lize. Since effective refusal to sell is a restraint on trade, these prohibitions
should be more often applied. The vestiges of special immunity should be
stripped away.
98. 326 U.S. 1, 14 (1945). Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion pointed out that
exclusive sales arrangements are widely upheld. Id. at 23.
99. The dissent of Justice Roberts, that AP was thus improperly rendered a public
utility subject to a duty to serve all, reemphasizes the refusal to sell. And in effect it
urges that a group boycott is legal. 326 U.S. 1, 29 (1945). Nor does the majority rule at
any point say that group boycott is illegal per se.
100. See United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79,
87 (7th Cir. 1949).
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The present law applying to group action may indicate suitable limits for
individual refusal to sell. As an enterprise grows in power, the effect on com-
petition of its refusal to sell is as great as the effect of a group boycott. On
the other hand, the prohibitions should not be carried too far. The problems
presented by individual or group refusal to sell are eminently suited to the
"rule of reason." The determinants of legality should be not the method, but
rather the purpose, the result, and the underlying monopoly power.
